The Path of Empire. A Chronicle of the United States as a World Power
by Carl Russell Fish
he would do much to establish the prestige of the United States as a wise and disinterested counselor in
Spanish American affairs. In this his first diplomatic undertaking, there appeared, however, one of the
weaknesses of execution which constantly interfered with the success of his plans. He did not know how
to sacrifice politics to statesmanship, and he appointed as his agents men so incompetent that they
aggravated rather than settled the difficulty. Later he saw his mistake and made a new and admirable
appointment in the case of Mr. William H. Trescot of South Carolina. Blaine himself, however, lost
office before new results could be obtained; and Frelinghuysen recalled Trescot and abandoned the
attempt to force peace.
A second object of Blaine's policy was to prevent disputes between Latin American and European
powers from becoming dangerous by acting as mediator between them. When he took office, France was
endeavoring to collect from Venezuela a claim which was probably just. When Venezuela proved
obdurate, France proposed to seize her custom houses and to collect the duties until the debt was paid.
Blaine protested, urged Venezuela to pay, and suggested that the money be sent through the American
agent at Caracas. He further proposed that, should Venezuela not pay within three months, the United
States should seize the custom houses, collect the money, and pay it to France. Again his short term
prevented him from carrying out his policy, but it is nevertheless of interest as anticipating the plan
actually followed by President Roosevelt in the case of Santo Domingo.
Blaine was just as much opposed to the peaceful penetration of European influence in the Western
Hemisphere as to its forceful expression. The project of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, to be built
and owned by a French company, had already aroused President Hayes on March 8, 1880, to remark:
"The policy of this country is a canal under American control. The United States cannot consent to the
surrender of this control to any European power or to any combination of European powers." Blaine
added that the passage of hostile troops through such a canal when either the United States or Colombia
was at war, as the terms of guarantee of the new canal allowed, was "no more admissible than on the
railroad lines joining the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the United States."
It is characteristic of Blaine that, when he wrote this dispatch, he was apparently in complete ignorance
of the existence of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, in which the United States accepted the exactly opposite
principles - had agreed to a canal under a joint international guarantee and open to the use of all in time
of war as well as of peace. Discovering this obstacle, he set to work to demolish it by announcing to
Great Britain that the treaty was antiquated, thirty years old, that the development of the American
Pacific slope had changed conditions, and that, should the treaty be observed and such a canal remain
unfortified, the superiority of the British fleet would give the nation complete control. Great Britain,
however, could scarcely be expected to regard a treaty as defunct from old age at thirty years, especially
as she also possessed a developing Pacific coast. Moreover, if the treaty was to British advantage, at least
the United States had accepted it. Great Britain, therefore, refused to admit that the treaty was not in full
force. Blaine then urged the building of an American canal across the Isthmus of Nicaragua, in defiance
of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty - a plan which received the support of even President Arthur, under whom
a treaty for the purpose was negotiated with the Republic of Nicaragua. Before this treaty was ratified by
the Senate, however, Grover Cleveland, who had just become President, withdrew it. He believed in the
older policy, and refused his sanction to the new treaty on the ground that such a canal "must be for the
world's benefit, a trust for mankind, to be removed from the chance of domination by any single power."
The crowning glory of Blaine's system, as he planned it, was the cooperation of the American republics
for common purposes. He did not share Seward's dream that they would become incorporated States of
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